Online sources:

Anthony O'Brien, Smoot-Hawley Tariff, EH.Net Encyclopedia (Robert Whaples ed., 2001), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/obrien.hawley-smoot.tariff. Provides a helpful overview of the events leading up to the act's passage and its macroeconomic effects.

Mark Milder, Parade of Protection: A Survey of the European Reaction to the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Major Themes in Economics, Spring 1999, http://www.cba.uni.edu/economics/Themes/milder.pdf. Examines the retaliatory nature of the actions of various nations after the act's passage.

Historical New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal. Available from many public libraries via ProQuest.

 

Offline sources, in chronological order:

U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 71st Congress, 2d Session Official Congressional Directory (2d ed. 1930). Biographical information about members of Congress, including committee assignments, terms of service, vote margins, etc.

Arthur W. Macmahon, Second Session of the Seventy-First Congress, 24 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 913 (1930). Article reviews the organization and major accomplishments of the congressional session that ran from Dec. 2, 1929 to July 3, 1930; legislative history of Tariff is discussed in detail on pp. 920–26.

F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (8th ed. 1931). Exactly what it sounds like; considered an economic classic. Last chapter focuses on legislative history and rates of 1930 Tariff. Incidentally, Taussig was one of the main signatories among the 1028 economists who asked Hoover to veto the bill.

Joseph M. Jones, Tariff Retaliation: Repercussions of the Hawley-Smoot Bill (1934). Examines in depth the retaliatory actions of various countries as well as the factors going into their decision-making process. Also examines the effects the Tariff had on the respective nations.

E.E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (1935). Now-classic treatise, arguing that Tariff rates were due to essentially unchecked lobbying by agricultural and industrial special interests. Focuses primarily on House hearings.

Federic Benham, Great Britain Under Protection (1941). Examines the causes and effects of British protectionist measures during the depression.

Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929–1976 (1980). Part of a larger book, but pp. 73–84 argue that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was largely driven by party politics.

Jude Wanniski, The Way the World Works (1983). Also part of a larger book, but pp. 138–52 looks at how stock prices reacted to Tariff news; argues that big market drops were correlated with news that Tariff was likely to pass.

Barry Eichengreen, The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2001, 1986). Part of a larger work that analyzes the political economy surrounding the Tariff, but pp. 46-41 considers the extent to which foreign nations retaliated against the United States.

Barry Eichengreen, The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 12 Res. Econ. Hist. 1 (1989). Suggests that Smoot-Hawley was driven by a coalition of northern farmers and light industries, but bulk of article focuses on modeling Tariff's macroeconomic effects.

Colleen M. Callahan et al., Who Voted For Smoot-Hawley?, 54 J. Econ. Hist. 683 (1994). Empirically analyzes Eichengreen's argument with respect to House of Representatives; finds that unemployment and party affiliation provide better explanations for the voting patterns.

Frank N. Magill, Canada Passes Tariffs to Ease the Great Depression, 2 Great Events from History II (1994). Examines the causes and effects of the Canadian Emergency Tariff Act.

Richard T. Cupitt & Euel Elliott, Schattschneider Revisited: Senate Voting on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 6 Econ. Pol. 187 (1994). Looks at Senate votes on ten individual rates; finds that party affiliation is statistically significant explanation for voting patterns, and that electoral vulnerability, state income, and producer interests are not.

Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, 45 Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Series Pub. Pol'y 173 (1996). Analyzes legislative history in Senate; concludes that producer beneficiaries in each Senator's constituency are important determinant of voting behavior, and that there were logrolling coalitions between sugar and glass and between lumber and oil.

Douglas A. Irwin, The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment, 80 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 326 (1998). Examines by ways of a counterfactual simulation the extent to which the collapse of U.S. imports can be attributed to the Tariff versus other factors such as declining income or foreign retaliation.